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JOSEPH W. LITTLFt AND THOMAS TOMPKINSt
The present push in Washington to open to public scrutiny the
decision processes of the federal government presents a timely oppor-
tunity to examine the workings of the "Government in the Sunshine"'
laws that have been enacted in most2 states during the past decade or
two.' As -the popular name suggests, these laws are intended to open
up governmental decision making to public view and participation. An
evaluation of them will undoubtedly be colored strongly by one's van-
tage point of their operation. Presumably, the scholarly writing on the
subject to date has been penned by authors who themselves are ob-
servers of and not participants in government. 4 Without question, a
member of the press who benefits from new openness and a public of-
ficial who feels hemmed in by it would have views differing in some
respects from each other and from those of totally objective critics.
t Professor of Law, Spessard L. Holland Law Center, University of Florida.
$ Captain, United States Army.
1. This is the popular name for Florida's open government law. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 286.011 (Supp. 1974). Deriving both from the notion of "out in the open" and from
Florida's public relations label as the "sunshine state," this descriptive expression appar-
ently has gained widespread use.
2. Meetings of various governmental bodies are declared to be open -to the public
in forty-one states; see Appendix II.
3. To be compared with this report of forty-one states with statutory and constitu-
tional provisions in 1974 is a report of twenty-six states with laws in 1961. Note, Open
Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know", 75 HAnv. L. REv. 199
(1962).
4. See, e.g., H. CRoss, THE PEoPLE's Riocsr To KNow (1953); Campbell, Public
Access to Government Documents, 41 AusmAUAN L.J. 73 (1967); Greenberg, An An-
notated History of Florida's "Sunshine Law", 118 CONG. REc. 26908 (1972); Hennings,
A Legislative Measure to Augment the Free Flow of Information, 8 AM. U.L. REv. 19
(1959); Pickerell, Agencies and the Public: Secrecy and the Access to Administrative
Records, 118 CoNG. REc. 26903 (1972); Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In: Open-Meeting
Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw.
U.L. REv. 480 (1973); Comment, Access to Governmental Information in California,
54 CAui . L. REv. 1650 (1966); Note, An Extension of the Public Hearing Principle,
46 CHr.-KENT L. REv. 207 (1966); Note, 75 HRv. L. REv., supra note 3; Comment,
The Iowa Open Meetings Act: A Right Without a Remedy?, 58 IowA L. Rnv. 210
(1972); Note, Public Authorities-Records of Public Authorities Not Open to Public In-
spection, 13 SAcusE L. RIv. 339 (1961); Note, Administrative Law-Freedom of In-
formation-Texas Open Meetings Act Has Potentially Broad Coverage But Suffers From
Inadequate Enforcement Provisions, 49 TExAs L. REV. 764 (1971); Note, Government
in the Sunshine: Promise or Placebo?, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 361 (1971).
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Being possessed of an elective public office, a full time job as a law
teacher, and the distinction of being one of only two public officials
known to have been acquitted of criminal charges under a Sunshine
Law perhaps gives the principal author of this article a unique perspec-
tive from which to comment about the subject.5 At least these factors
shape some well formed biases.
Eliminating secrecy in government is not so simple a task as it first
might seem. In an era of electronic communication, enforcement is
always problematical at best. But more than enforcement is involved.
One assumes that some public purpose is to be served by open govern-
ment. Starting from that assumption, one quickly learns that other
public purposes can be adversely affected by insisting upon too strin-
gent controls. For example, placing public officials in a complete com-
munication vacuum and allowing them to speak to one another only
in a public meeting would presumably attain the highest degree of
"publicness" in governmental decision making. Yet, the practicalities
of doing the business of government would be totally lost, and the
crucible of informal interchange and debate, which is the source of
most ideas, would be quenched. Furthermore, public officials would
be set apart from other citizens as mere dummies with rights of free
speech and free association suspended during their terms in office.
In view of this conflict in public purposes, it is not surprising that
most appellate litigation has dealt with coverage issues. That is, under
what circumstances is a group of public officials required to meet the
open government requirements of a particular statute? Quite often
these contests have pitted an offended group of local elected officials,
who feel their individual rights are being unnecessarily or illegally
abridged, against representatives of the press, who believe the officials
are conducting the public's business behind an illegal cloak of secrecy.
The resolution of the individual disputes requires an answer to the
question of how far did the legislature go in its open government stat-
ute. This is the stuff of law suits and is of primary concern to the liti-
gating parties. Of more general concern from a policy point of view
5. The principal author is a professor of law at the University of Florida College
of Law and an elected City Commissioner of the City of Gainesville, Florida. Shortly
after being seated in office, he was arrested on charges of having violated FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 286.011 (Supp. 1974), Florida's Sunshine Law. The charges stemmed from a
luncheon meeting in a public restaurant attended by the author, one other member of
the five person board and the general manager of the city's utility system, who was an
employee of the Commission. The charges resulted in a jury trial and acquittal of the
two Commissioners. No. 72-8031 (Alachua County Ct.).
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are issues pertaining to individual liberties and operational practicali-
ties. The first issue resolves into a question of how far legislatures can
go in requiring governmental decision making to be done in public
view without invalidly invading the constitutional freedoms of affected
officials. The second resolves into a question of how far a legislature
should go in creating the best balance between openness and practical-
ity in decision making.
Any practical consideration of coverage must deal with at least
four factors. One is the presumption of openness; a second is the al-
lowance of exceptions; a third is the application to less than quorum
numbers of a covered body; and a fourth is enforcement mechanisms.
By presumption of openness is meant the existence of a legally en-
forceable right for members of the public to be present at the meetings
of covered governmental bodies if no provision expressly concerning
the particular kind of meeting exists. The two extremes are: fully
open, meaning that all meetings are open to the public unless specifi-
cally closed; and, fully closed, meaning that all may be closed unless
specifically opened. As has been documented by other authors, 6 the
common law evolved no concept of a right in the public to be present,
much less to participate, in meetings of governmental decision makers.
Perhaps this historical shortfall lies in the feudal origins of our law.
But whatever the reason, it leaves us with a status of no inherent public
right to open government. Except as the people in their constitutions 7
6. Note, 75 HARV. L. REv., supra note 3, at 1203-04.
7. Thirty-five states have constitutional provisions relating to open government in
some respect. ALA. CoNsT. art. 4, § 57; ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 13; CAL. CONsT. art.
4, § 7; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 14; CONN. CONST. art. 3, § 16; DEL. CONST. art. 2, §
11; IDAHO CONST. art. 3, § 12; ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 5(c); IND. CONST. art. 4, § 13;
IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 13; MD. CONST. art. III, § 21; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 20; MINN.
CONST. art. 4, § 19; MISS. CONsT. art. 4, § 58; Mo. CONST. art. 3, § 20; MONT. CONST.
art. V, § 13; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 11; Nav. CONsT. art. 4, § 12; N.H. CONST. pt.
2, art. 8; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 12; N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 10; N.D. CONST. art. 2,
§ 50; Omo CONST. art. 2, § 13; ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 14; PA. CONST. art. 2, § 13;
P.R. CONST. art. HI, § 11; S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 23; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 15; TENN.
CONST. art. 2. § 22; TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 16; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 15; VT. CONST.
ch. II, § 8; WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 11; WiS. CONST. art. 4, § 10; WYo. CONST. art. 3,
§ 14. Typically, sessions of each house of the legislature and of committees of the
whole shall be open, unless in the opinion of the legislature, the business is such as ought
to be secret. In Utah and Texas all sessions of the legislature are declared open, except
that the senates may meet in executive session. Texas limits executive sessions to mat-
ters that are not discrete to reveal to the public and for consideration of gubernatorial
appointments. Colorado authorizes executive sessions of the Senate for deliberation
upon executive appointments, but requires that all votes be taken in an open session.
Illinois and Ohio require a two-thirds vote of the house involved to determine that the
proceedings should be secret. No state's constitution authorizes legislation to enforce
open government provisions. Nevertheless, statutes'in Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
1975] 453
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or the legislators in statutes8 choose to mandate these rights, they do
not exist.
Starting from the common-law status, legislatures must make a
basic policy choice about the standards of openness that are to be im-
posed. Some of the decided cases demonstrate the extreme positions.
Acord v. Booth9 was perhaps the first sunshine law case. There, a
citizen of Provo City, Utah had been bodily ejected from a meeting
of the Provo city council, sitting as a "committee of the whole." Under
an 1898 statute, requiring that the council "shall sit with open doors
and keep a journal of its own proceedings,"'10 the plaintiff sued for
money damages in vindication of the infringement of his right as a citi-
zen to be present during the meeting. Rejecting the argument that
the open government law did not apply to the council sitting as a "com-
mittee of the whole," a procedure adopted to loosen parliamentary
rules prevailing during meetings of the council, the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed a jury verdict of damages in the amount of one cent.
According to the court, the law required not only "[tihat the public
might know how the vote stood," but also "that the public might know
what the councilmen thought about the matters."" The position of
the Utah court could be described as one holding that within the cover-
age of the statute everything that is not expressly closed to the public
is open."2 A number of other states have followed this lead, including
California' 3 and Florida.'
6-602 to -604 (1956), and New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 91-A:1 to :8
(Supp. 1973), specifically provide for enforcement, while statutes in a number of other
states do so by implication. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 4-44 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 402-04(a) (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
318.2 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 52-7-1 to -4 (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.77 (Supp.
1974).
8. See Appendix U.
9. 33 Utah 279, 93 P. 734 (1908).
10. Id. at 281, 93 P. at 735.
11. Id. at 284,93 P. at 735-36.
12. Nevertheless, the court did not perceive that the public would always best be
served by total openness, nor did it see the Utah law as requiring it. According to the
dictum of the court, matters that "might adversely affect public interests if conducted
and discussed openly" might be referred to special committees to which the law did not
apply. Id. at 284, 93 P. at 736. Hence, the Utah court acknowledged that openness
in government was but one public interest, which on occasion could be outweighed by
others. In proposing the special committee formula for working out the conflict in the
context of requiring all meetings of the final decision-making body to be open, however,
the court apparently intended that all matters requiring a decision of the governing body
would finally be put on the floor for debate and decision making in public.
13. The California cases deal with a statute requiring that "All meetings of the
legislative body of a local agency shall be open and public, and all persons shall be per-
mitted to attend any meeting of the legislative body of a local agency, except as other
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Standing in contradistinction to the all-is-open view is the position
that all is closed except that which is specifically opened. This view
apparently prevails in Ohio, where, mindful of the common law ap-
wise provided ... ." CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 54953 (West Supp. 1974). In the preamble
to the law the California legislature stated it "to be the intent of the law that [affected
bodies'] actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly." Id.
§ 54950. Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805 (3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1960), was a taxpayer's action under the open government statute seeking to
invalidate a zoning ordinance that had been considered in a non-public meeting by an
advisory planning commission before being adopted by the city council. Although
the decision of the appellate court was sufficiently supported by a holding that the
planning commission was not a "legislative body" as defined by the statute, CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 54952 (West Supp. 1974) and, therefore, was not subject to the open
meeting requirements, the court stated in dictum that the law "was not directed at any-
thing less than a formal meeting of a city council or one of the city's subordinate agen-
cies" and, therefore, "does not forbid such informal development of facts pertinent to
zoning problems." 184 Cal. App. 2d at -, -, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 810, 811. Adler was
criticized in Comment, Access to Governmental Information in California, 54 CALIF.
L. P~v. 1650, 1651-57 (1966). The California legislature broadened the definition of
the term "legislative body" to include committees and also boards and commissions sup-
ported by funds provided by legislative bodies. CAL. Gov'T CObn § 54952.3 (West Supp.
1974). In Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), the only appellate court
opinion interpreting the revised statute, a trial court had issued a preliminary injunction
restraining the board of county supervisors from holding "any closed meeting at which
three or more members were Iresent except under the statutory exceptions for personnel
and national security matters." Id. at -, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 483. The suit was brought
in the aftermath of a meeting held by the board at an Elks Club with counsel, adminis-
trators and union officials to discuss an employees' strike. On appeal, the board sought
to have the injunction dissolved on the grounds that the statute as interpreted by Adler
did not proscribe non-decisional, information gathering sessions such as the one in dis-
pute. The board also argued that it had a right to confer with its attorney in private
as an element of the attorney-client privilege afforded by California law. Refusing to
accept the Adler approach, the court reexamined the background and purposes of the
open meeting law to conclude that it applied to "informal sessions or conferences of the
board members designed for the discussion of public business." Id. at -, 69 Cal. Rptr.
at 487. The court also concluded, however, that the California statutory attorney-client
privilege was not repealed by implication as it applied to legislative bodies.
In summary, the California law and cases develop distinctions concerning where the
line is to be drawn between openness and competing public interests. In California mat-
ters affecting national security and sensitive personnel matters are carved out from the
open government law. The Newspaper Guild case likewise carves out a lawyer-client
privilege in justifiable circumstances. The Newspaper Guild opinion also rejects the
earlier notion of Adler that coverage extends only to "formal" meetings and puts Cali-
fornia in the "all meetings" category of Acord v. Booth.
14. Florida is far and away the champion state so far as litigation under a sunshine
law is concerned. Under a statute providing that:
(1) All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority
or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or any po-
litical subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the constitution, at which
official acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the pub-
lic at all times, and no resolution, rule, regulation or formal action shall be
considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting.
FA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (1974), no less than ten appellate decisions have been ren-
dered. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973); Bassett v.
Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972); City of Miami Beach v, Berns 245 So, 2d 38
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proach, the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted1" a statute declaring "all
meetings to be public meetings open to the public at all times" 10
as not precluding non-public executive sessions in which no formal ac-
tion is to be taken. Although a later Ohio case 17 invalidated formal
actions taken in an executive session, the judicial construction of the
legislature's intention in that state is that the common-law rule remains
in effect except as the legislature has explicitly ruled otherwise.
If one accepts as the better rule that all is open except that which
is specifically closed, as the authors do, he must then decide under what
circumstances, if any, excluding the public should be allowed. Most
sunshine laws acknowledge a need for closed meetings under specified
circumstances in which widespread noising about of a given matter
might prove adverse to the public interest.18 Typical exceptions allow
(Fla. 1971); Jones v. Tanzler, 238 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1970); Board of Pub. Instruction
v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); Bigelow v. Howze, 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974); IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla.
1974); Shaughnessy v. Metropolitan Dade County, 238 So. 2d 466 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970);
Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). While
a district court of appeals at one time acknowledged an attorney-client privilege in the
law, id., the supreme court has later strongly implied that there are no exceptions, Can-
ney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, supra, except as constitutionally guaranteed for collec-
tive bargaining purposes, Bassett v. Braddock, supra.
15. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. City of Akron, 3 Ohio St. 2d 191, 209
N.E.2d 399 (1965).
16. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page 1969).
17. State ex rel. Humphrey v. Adkins. 18 Ohio App. 2d 101, 247 N.E.2d 330
(1969). In that case a school board had readmitted a formerly expelled student in exec-
utive session. The court held the readmission invalid. Adkins cited Blum v. Board of
Zoning & Appeals, 1 Misc. 2d 668, 149 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1956), which carried the
invalidity position to the extent of saying, "[n]or is this invalidity cured by an an-
nouncement, subsequently made at a public meeting, of the action already taken at the
executive session." Id. at -, 149 N.Y.S.2d at 8. See also Dayton Newspapers, Inc.
v. City of Dayton, 28 Ohio App. 2d 95, 274 N.E.2d 766 (1971); Thomas v. Board of
Trustees, 5 Ohio App. 2d 265, 215 N.E.2d 434 (1966).
18. Executive sessions are authorized by open meeting statutes in thirty-nine states
(full citations may be found in Appendix I): Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
In New Mexico, the statute contemplates executive sessions by providing that all final
decisions shall be made at public meetings. In five states, properly convened executive
sessions may be held only upon a majority vote of the affected agency: Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Connecticut, Maine, and North Carolina. Hawaii and Iowa only require a two-
thirds vote of the affected agency. The majority of statutes prohibit final action during
an executive session: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana,
Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah. Most
of these statutes, however, offer little guidance for determining what actions may prop.
erly be taken. Despite this general lack of guidelines, Wisconsin's statute provides that
no formal action shall be introduced, deliberated upon, or adopted during an executive
sessin, Sevegl courts havc held that a formal rertn of action takcn in executive ses-
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private sessions to consult legal counsel concerning pending litigation,"9
to consider issues relating to the character or good name of any per-
son,20 complaints21 and disciplinary actions against government em-
ployees, 22 acquisition of real property,' 3 matters of public finance,24
matters required to be kept confidential by Federal regulation 25 or law,
municipal charter or ordinance,2 6 quasi-judicial issues,2 7 and others as
specified in particular states.
28
In the face of an all-is-open statute with no exceptions, difficult
problems can be placed upon governmental bodies. The courts have
sion does not comply with the open meetings concept. IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town
of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), af 'd sub nom. Town of
Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974); Scott v. Town of Bloomfield. 94
N.J. Super. 592, 229 A.2d 667 (L. Div.), aff'd on other grounds, 98 N.J. Super. 321,
237 A.2d 297 (App. Div. 1967), dismissed as moot, 52 N.J. 473, 246 A.2d 129 (1968)
(per curiam); Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, 80 N.J. Super. 452, 194 A.2d 26 (L. Div.
1963), ajf'd per curiam, 45 N.J. 268, 212 A.2d 153 (1965); Blum v. Board of Zoning
& Appeals, 1 Misc. 2d 668, 149 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1956). Contra, Collinsville School
Dist. # 10 v. Witte, 5 Ill. App. 3d 600, 283 N.E.2d 718 (1972); Reilly v. Board of
Selectmen, 345 Mass. 363, 187 N.E.2d 838 (1963).
19. Three states provide statutory attorney-client privileges. Mo. ANN. STAT. §
610.025(2) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(5) (1974); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 66.77(3)(f) (1974). California courts recognized such an exception by
strictly construing the California statute not to be in derogation of the common-law
privilege. Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 69
Cal. Rptr. 480, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41 (1968). The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to
acknowledge such an exception where none was provided in the statute. Laman v. Mc-
Cord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968). The situation is confusing in Florida
where the privilege was recognized as an exception by a district court of appeals and
apparently by the supreme court. Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425, 428 (Fla. 1972);
Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). In
a later case, however, the supreme court rejected the privilege as an exception to the
open meeting requirement. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260, 277
(Fla. 1973).
20. Alabama, Alaska, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin; see
Appendix II.
21. California, Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin; see Appendix II.
22. Arkansas, California, Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin; see Appendix I1.
23. Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Wisconsin; see
Appendix II.
24. Alaska, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Wisconsin; see Appendix II.
25. Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and South Dakota; see Appendix I.
26. Alaska, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Dakota, and South Dakota; see Ap-
pendix HI.
27. Alaska, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Washington, and
Wisconsin; see Appendix II.
28. Labor negotiations are privileged by statute in California, Illinois, and North
Carolina, see Appendix II, and in Florida by judicial fiat, Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So.
2d 425, 428 (Fla. 1972). In Illinois executive sessions are authorized for the concilia-
tion of complaints arising from discriminatory treatment in violation of federal, state,
or local law, see Appendix I.
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met these situations in different ways. For example, under a law2 D
that contains explicit exceptions only for matters affecting national
security and sensitive personnel matters, a California court was called
upon to decide the legitimacy of a governmental body's conferring in
private with legal counsel. Finding that the common law attorney-
client privilege could be claimed by public bodies in their client's roles
and further finding that the common law in that specific detail had not
been abrogated by the open government law, this court carved out a
lawyer-client exception for justifiable circumstances. 30
The California approach exhibits flexibility and an appreciation
of the realities of local government. One of the realities is, of course,
that in many respects local government operates in a business-like way.
Decisions must be made concerning strategy in law suits involving pri-
vate litigants as opposing parties and to give away one's hand to the
opposition which remains free to operate in private, can prove very
detrimental to the side of the public. Notwithstanding this, other
courts have not accepted the flexible California approach. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court of Florida has interpreted the law of that state
to be of the all-is-open mode, meaning every meeting every time,,'
excepting only the Florida constitutional provision for collective bar-
gaining strategy sessions.32  Even the California attorney-client doc-
trine has apparently been rejected. 3
In practice, this stance can create very unsettling episodes for gov-
ernmental officials. As to exactly how unsettling they can be, one must
first consider enforcement possibilities. Typically, sunshine law en-
forcement tools range from none at all,34 to criminal penalties," to in-
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-60 (West Supp. 1974); see note 13 supra.
30. Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 69
Cal. Rptr. 480, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41 (1968).
31. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
32. Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972). The court was interpreting
the following language from the Florida constitution: "The right of employees, by and
through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged."
FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
33. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
34. Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, North Dakota, Ohio, and
Wisconsin; see Appendix II.
35. To meet secretly in violation of a sunshine law constitutes a misdemeanor in
thirteen states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah; see Appendix II. Punish-
ment is by fine in Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ok-
lahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Vermont; see Appendix II. Imprisonment is provided
for in Illinois, Indiana, Maine, and Oklahoma; see Appendix I. At one time, Arkansas
allowed removal from office as a penalty, AuR. STAT. ANN. § 6-603 (1956), repealed,
No. 66, § 1, [1961] Ark. Acts 148; see note 109 infra.
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junctions,:" to writs of mandamus37 and other appropriate equitable
relief,' -to invalidation of actions taken.39 In Florida, for example,
criminal penalties, 40 injunctions, 41 and invalidation 2 are available.
In the light of the wide ranging enforcement potential and of the
Florida position concerning exceptions, consider the dilemma faced by
the governmental officials in the following situation that occurred in
a Florida city in late 1973. For a period of five years the City of
Gainesville litigated an anti-trust treble damages claim against Florida
Power Corporation and Florida Power and Light Company. Florida
Power Corporation had a viable counterclaim, but Florida Power and
Light did not. In July or August of 1973 lawyers of Florida Power
Corporation informed the city's lawyers of a willingness to negotiate
a settlement to avert going to trial in September. Florida Power Cor-
poration demanded that negotiations be conducted in complete secrecy.
Without any input from elected officials for whom they work and with-
out informing the officials that negotiations were proceeding, the city's
lawyers negotiated a proposed settlement. In presenting the proposal
to the governing body in a public meeting, the city's lawyers cautioned
that no probing questions be asked because the settlement was some-
what fragile and because the suit with Florida Power and Light Com-
pany, which involved identical issues, was still pending and awaiting
trial. The elected officials were asked to make a decision on the $2
million settlement as soon as possible. Claimed damages were $4.5
million, which if recovered fully in trial would yield a triple recovery
of $13.5 million for the public. Florida Power also had a counterclaim
of litigable merit that upon prevailing would also yield triple damages.
Permissible fines range from ten dollars to one thousand dollars, and sentences
range from thirty days to just less than a year. Louisiana, Minnesota, and Texas pro-
vide greater penalties for subsequent convictions. Whether a finding of wilful violation
is required for conviction remains largely unsettled. The Florida Supreme Court ruled
in dictum that proof of scienter is required, Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224
So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969), and California makes a violation criminally actionable only
when secret action is taken "with knowledge of the fact that the meeting is in violation
of the law." CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 54959 (West Supp. 1974).
36. California, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, New Hampshire,
and North Carolina; see Appendix II.
37. Arizona, California, Illinois, Iowa, and North Carolina; see Appendix IL
38. Arizona, California, Maine, and Massachusetts; see Appendix U.
39. Arizona, Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey, and Okla-
homa; see Appendix II. See also note 18 supra.
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(3) (1974).
41. Id. § 286.011(2).
42. IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla.
1974).
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What course of action could the elected officials safely take in try-
ing to inform themselves of the merits of the proposed settlement?
What is the consequence if they guess wrong about the legality of what
they do? In view of the apparent denial13 of an attorney-client excep-
tion, it would seem foolhardy to risk hashing out the pros and cons with
the lawyers in a closed meeting of the whole body. Moreover, since
the Florida Supreme Court has several times warned about the evils
of attempting to evade the law by breaking into small committees,
4'
it would seem unwise for the officials to consult the lawyers two at a
time. This leaves individual consultations with the lawyers as a last
resort.45 Obviously, such a procedure does not afford the tempering
of judgments and impressions that comes from discussion and argumen-
tation. Pressing further, one may suppose two officials happened to
cross paths on the street comer. Could they safely exchange ideas on
the matter confronting them? Based upon the rationale that what
could not be done officially should not be done unofficially, they could
not.
But what would be the consequences if the law were ignored in
any of these situations and discussions were held? This is where en-
forcement produces its effect. First, the law's criminal sanctions might
be imposed, making a violation punishable as a misdemeanor. 40  Per-
haps even more troublesome than that is the threat that any settlement
the city and the power company might later agree to in public would
be invalidated because of improper meetings.47 In summary, it ap-
pears that the only safe course to take would be for individual officials
to meet privately with counsel to probe the issues as they best can and
then vote without discussion in a public meeting. Even if one rejects
43. See text accompanying note 33 sura.
44. City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1971); Jones v. Tanzler,
238 So. 2d 91, 92-93 (Fla. 1970) (concurring opinion). See also Bigelow v. Howze,
291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach,
279 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Town of Palm Beach v. Grad-
ison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
45. That this procedure threatens to transfer the policy-making role to the legal
advisor should be obvious. As to the legality of the procedure, a recent opinion of the
Florida Attorney-General has warned that "Care must be taken . . . not to intentionally
avoid the requirements of an open meeting by having an individual who is not a board
member act as a liason for board members by circulating information and thoughts of
individual councilmen to the rest of the board." FLA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. 074-47, Feb. 13,
1974.
46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(3) (1974).
47. IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct.




the worst possible outcome of the episode described above as being
too farfetched to be believable, the situation as it has already emerged
makes a travesty of the open government law. Not only were the press
and the public unaware of the negotiations and unable to participate
in them, but the elected officials themselves were also completely shut
out from the very important original stages of the decisional process
that Florida's appellate courts have said must be open to public scru-
tiny. This ironic consequence of total openness can hardly be said to
optimize the public good.
I. FUNDAMENTAL IsSUES
The foregoing pages describe the state of judicial interpretations
of open government laws. The clear and open approach of the Cali-
fornia and Utah cases stand in contrast to the clear but rather closed
approach of Ohio and other states. Florida's cases, marked by a zeal
for openness and an abandonment of legal craftsmanship in favor of
imposing rhetoric while evincing total openness, place difficult burdens
upon public officials. The Florida courts have denied any function in
passing upon the "wisdom or unwisdom ' 41 of what the legislature has
rendered into law and often have invited offended litigants to seek as-
sistance in the legislative halls if some exception to the open govern-
ment law is needed.49  This analysis suggests that a need exists for
a sense of policy direction about competition between open govern-
ment and the public interest as manifested in some other sphere and
about where the line should be drawn. This is largely a matter of dif-
ferentiating between policy making, which should be covered by the
strictures of open government laws, and implementation, which ordi-
narily should not be so encumbered. The line drawing is particularly
difficult with public bodies that have both policy making and imple-
menting functions, such as local governmental bodies and some state
agencies. Purely legislative bodies rarely, if ever, face analogous
dilemmas, which may account for the insensitivity to the point in some
laws. Before the pros and cons of this line drawing are examined,
however, the question of whether any overriding constitutional restraint
48. Jones v. Tanzler, 238 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 1970) (concurring opinion); City
of Miami Beach v. Berns, 231 So. 2d 847, 849-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), cert. dis-
charged, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971). But see Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296
So. 2d 473, 480-81 (Fla. 1974) (dissenting opinion).
49. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1973); Jones
v. Tanzler, 238 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla. 1970); Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So.
2d 693, 700 (Fla. 1969).
1975]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
limits the permissible scope of open government regulations will be ad-
dressed.
Beginning from a position that the public has no right to be pres-
ent and participate in meetings of governmental bodies, as they did, 0
early proponents of open government laws occupied themselves with
opening up scheduled meetings of elected governmental bodies sitting
as a whole. The law at issue in Acord v. Booth,al requiring that
councils sit "with open doors," is perhaps illustrative. Having attained
one level of success, proponents of open government found that gov-
ernmental bodies often conduct business preliminarily in informal work
sessions or in committees. Or perhaps, bodies began to change their
modi operendi after open government laws removed the shrouds from
regular meetings. At any rate, in Acord, the members convened
themselves in an informal "committee of a whole" to discuss business
in a less rigid environment and in private. The Acord court ruled,
as has been seen earlier, that the law required that the decision-making
process, and not just the final vote, be opened to public view. There-
fore, although special committees could appropriately consider matters
of which open discussion "might adversely affect public interests," com-
mittees of the whole where the final votes were taken were not exempt
from the law. After a false start in Adler v. City Council,52 which
severely restricted the application of the California Sunshine Law,
Newspaper Guild53 interpreted the revised California statute to cover
all meetings of boards and their committees in which a quorum or more
was present, whether the purpose of the meeting be for deliberation
and discussion or for "formal action." But California has not aban-
doned the Acord position that the public interest sometimes requires
confidentiality. The statute explicitly supplies national security and
personnel exceptions and Newspaper Guild itself interpreted the whole
of California law as providing a limited attorney-client exemption."
It is only in Florida that the movement toward open government
50. See, e.g., Note, 75 HARV. L. REv., supra note 3.
51. 33 Utah 279, 93 P. 734 (1908).
52. 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1960).
53. Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1968).
54. Id. The court was able to interpret California's open government law as not
impliedly repealing the attorney-client privilege statute as it applied to legislative bodies
and their lawyers. The Supreme Court of Arkansas was unable to make such an ac-
commodation in Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 753 (1968), under an
open government law that allowed no exceptions except as "specifically" provided. None
was provided for the attorney-client privilege and none was allowed by the court.
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has begun to concern itself with less than quorum numbers of regulated
bodies, and only in Florida have the legislature and courts not allowed
the possibility that the public interest is sometimes best served by
temporary confidentiality.5" Apparently, the Florida Supreme Court
has an abiding fear that public officials will engage in "hanky-panky"
if avenues are open for deviously depriving citizens of their "inalien-
able right to be present and be heard."56 Furthermore, the court has
implied that the evils being avoided make it necessary to apply the law
to "any convening of two or more officials.
'57
Consistent with whatever constitutional limitations might apply to
the structuring of government itself, legislatures can make their own
judgments about whether the public interest requires any exceptions
to the open government law, whether for committees or within the con-
text of the "formal-informal" dichotomy accepted by some legislatures
and courts. But the same is not necessarily true in extending the scope
to gatherings of less than a quorum in number, at least so far as the
application of criminal sanctions is concerned.
What is the limiting case in extending the scope of public meeting
laws? Ostensibly, the limiting case would be to attach criminal penal-
ties to the mere act of communicating about public business outside
a public meeting by two members of a public body. In deciding
whether such a regulation could be sustained as an appropriate exercise
of the police powers of a state, one must balance the interests being
protected by the regulation against abridgements of the freedoms of
speech and association guaranteed by the first amendment to the
United States Constitution. To illustrate the problem, consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical situations. Assume in each instance that a state
open government statute purports to outlaw the described incidents and
to visit criminal penalties upon convicted offenders. Assume in each
case that the commissioners referred to are members of a five-member
elected body of a city and that it takes a minimum of three votes to
pass any question before the body.
(1) Two commissioners meet by happenstance in a public res-
55. The only sure exception is that for collective bargaining, Bassett v. Braddock,
262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972). At the time this article is being written, the Florida legisla-
ture is considering a bill to remove that exception.
56. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969); see Note,
75 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 3 (demonstrates that no such "inalienable" right exists
in the common law or under the federal constitution).
57. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974); City of Miami
Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1971).
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taurant for lunch. During lunch they discuss golf and weather, but
no city business or public business of any kind. After lunch, the
two are arrested and later convicted under the open government
law.
(2) The second situation is the same as the first except, in addi-
tion to discussing golf and weather, the two commissioners discuss
current city business matters. No agreements are reached and no
promises about voting are made. The two are convicted under the
open government law.
(3) The third situation is the same as the second expect the com-
missioners meet by prior appointment. They are convicted under
the open government law.
(4) The fourth situation is the same as the third except the com-
missioners meet in a non-public place for the purpose of deciding
upon a common course of action concerning pending matters of
public business and agree to a voting pattern. They also agree to
engage other commissioners in secretive sessions to produce an
agreement of a majority prior to having public debate. The two
are convicted under an open government law.
In each situation, will the law withstand constitutional challenge?5 8
The remaining portion of this section will outline the details of the
issues that are raised by the intersection of sunshine laws and the first
amendment in the limiting case. In approaching this task, one might
categorize people entitled to claim the protections of the first amend-
ment in terms of their attachment to public decision-making processes
as follows: mere citizens, public employees and public officials.
Over repeated dissents of first amendment absolutists such as
Douglas and Black (most of the time), the Supreme Court has ruled
on occasion that first amendment freedoms are not quite inalienable
even as to mere citizens, but may be curtailed under limited circum-
stances. The use of speech alone can be punished under conspiracy
statutes when there is a "clear and present danger" that the substantive
evil to be prevented will be caused by the speech.50 Moreover,
"[w]here a statute does not directly abridge free speech, but-while
58. The third situation is essentially that faced by the principal author in his per-
sonal sunshine law violation. See note 5 supra. Since the case ended in an acquittal
by jury, the basic constitutional issues were not ruled upon by an appellate court.
59. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The "clear and present danger"
test is a rhetorical product of Justice Holmes. Apparently, it was first used in the cele-
brated case of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Schenck involved the
violation of an espionage act by persons encouraging men to avoid military service. The
opinion also contains the famous dictum that "the most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."
Id.
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regulating a subject within the State's power-tends to have the in-
cidental effect of inhibiting first amendment rights-it is well settled
that the statute can be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in rela-
tion to the need for control of the conduct and lack of alternative means
for doing so. ''6O No less a civil libertarian than Hugo Black himself
uttered that dictum in a majority opinion of the Court when it refused
to intervene in a state prosecution under a criminal syndicalism statute.
In the same vein, rights otherwise guaranteed by the first amendment
can be abridged when there is a "compelling state interest"6 1 that justi-
fies the infringement, such as the interest of the government in gaining
information to combat the overthrow of the government by force and
violence.62 Even the first amendment freedoms of mere citizens may
be limited where necessary to deny the threat of "clear and present
danger" posed by a conspiracy or when a "compelling state interest"
in restricting speech exists. 63
Citizens who become employees of the state or federal govern-
ments apparently relinquish some of their constitutional liberties within
the scope of the "compelling state interest" standard. It is well estab-
lished that a public employer may require loyalty to the government
and insist that it be pledged by oath.6 Apparently, this requirement
60. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971).
61. The following remark from Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957), is apparently the source of the "compel-
ling state interest" terminology: "For a citizen to be made to forego even part of so
basic a liberty as his political autonomy, the subordinating interest of the State must
be compelling." Id. at 265.
62. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
63. Not every threat or state rationale will suffice as "compelling," however. Citi-
zens may with impunity refuse to answer questions about their activities and associations
propounded by investigating committees of either the state or federal governments when
the government has not established that the line of questioning is relevant to the subject
matter under investigation. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins
v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). And before a state may compel an organization,
such as the NAACP, to disclose the identity of its members, the court must have "con-
trolling justification for the deterrent effect on free engagement of the right to associate
which disclosure of membership lists is likely to have." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449, 466 (1958). Hence, in the absence of such a showing, a state cannot compel a
foreign corporation to reveal its membership list as a qualification for doing business
within its borders.
64. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951). Garner refused to take
an oath that he would not "advise, advocate or teach, . . overthrow" of the government
by force and violence and had not done those things durine the preceding five years. In
upholding the statutory oath, the Supreme Court said, "the provisions operating thus
prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establish-
ing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States." Id. at
720-21. The Court noted, however, that California courts had required scienter as an
element of the statute. Id. at 723-24.
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is valid because state employment is a "privilege" that may be condi-
tioned upon reasonable terms of employment, including loyalty."
Moreover, the scope of inquiry as to loyalty may include past behavior,
because "'past conduct may well relate to present fitness'" and "'past
loyalty may have a reasonable relationship to present and future
trust.' ",6 Persons not choosing to pledge their loyalty may "retain
their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere.
67
The federal government may also regulate the political activities
of its employees, for example, by preventing their holding party offices,
working at polling places, and being party paymasters,08 and by pro-
hibiting their participation in political management and campaigns. 0
States may likewise validly prohibit their employees from engaging in
a wide range of partisan political activities.70 The compelling interest
65. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
66. Id. at 492-93, quoting Garner v. Board of Educ., 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951).
67. This language is extracted from Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952):
"It is. . . clear that [teachers] have no right to work for the state in the school system
on their terms.. .. They may work for the school system upon the reasonable terms
laid down by the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose to work on
such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and association and go elsewhere."
Id. at 492. The influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is at work here. In a Massa-
chusetts case involving the dismissal of a police officer who involved himself in politics
contrary to a rule of his department, Holmes said,
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire
in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free
speech as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of his contract. The serv-
ant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are of-
fered him.
McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892).
In testing loyalty, however, the government must allow an opportunity for an employee
or applicant to show that his association in a group advocating the violent overthrow
of government was innocent of knowledge of the disloyal aims of the group. Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). Hence, a loyalty statute suffers from constitutional
overbreadth if it leaves an innocent joiner only the options of admitting his association,
albeit innocent, and thereby losing the job, or committing perjury to get it. Likewise
a statute requiring that public employees list all organizations and associations of which
they are members is constitutionally invalid in that it presents greater infringement of
the freedom of association than legitimate state purposes allow. Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960).
68. United Pub. Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
69. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973).
70. These activities include:
soliciting contributions for partisan candidates, political parties, or other parti-
san political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local commit-
tees of political parties, or officers or committee members in partisan political
clubs, or candidates to any paid public office; taking part in the management
or affairs of any political party's partisan political campaign; serving as dele-
gates or alternates to caucuses or conventions of political parties; addressing
or taking an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings; soliciting votes
or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort to get voters to
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in these instances is to avoid the danger "'that political rather than
official effort may earn advancement and. . . that governmental favor
may be channelled through political connections.' 1 In short, under
appropriate circumstances, "the government has an interest in regu-
lating the conduct and 'the speech of its employees that differ(s)
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of
the speech of the citizenry in general.' "72
Nevertheless, a state's interest in disciplining public employees
does not justify the curtailing of a teacher's right to speak freely on
public issues in criticism of his "ultimate employer" when the speech
does not impede "the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties
in the classroom" or interfere, "with the regular operation of the
schools generally. '7 3  In these circumstances, the interest of the state
in limiting employees' "opportunities to contribute to public debate is
not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribu-
tion by any member of the general public."7 4  Any foreshortening of
this freedom can be justified only where the content of the criticism
leveled against the public employer is so utterly without merit as
to exceed the standards of defamation of public officials under New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.75  Those standards require nothing less
than that the defamatory utterances were made "with 'actual malice'-
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckdess disregard of
whether it was false or not."7 6  Mere negligence clearly is not suffi-
cient. 77  In the absence of behavior meeting these stringent criteria,
dismissal from employment cannot be employed validly to bridle the
tongues of public employees.78
the polls; participating in the distribution of partisan campaign literature; initi-
ating or circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding in caravans for any
political party or partisan political candidate.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616-17 (1973).
71. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 555 (1973), quoting United Pub. Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 98 (1947).
72. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 564 (1973), quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
73. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968). The Pickering
principle may have been badly eroded in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), in
which a majority of the Court allowed dismissal for cause on account of allegedly de-
famatory remarks made by a subordinate federal employee of his superior. Justices
Marshall and Douglas dissented; Justice White dissented in part.
74. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
75. Id., citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
76. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
77. Id. at 288.
78. Pickering v. Board of Edue., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
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Moving the inquiry into the domain of elected public officials, the
class primarily affected by open government laws, one finds relatively
little litigation regarding first amendment freedoms. In a case in which
a public prosecutor has been convicted of criminal defamation for criti-
cizing judges as being lazy and inefficient, the United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that even erroneous critical statements might
be the subject of civil or criminal penalties only if made with "the high
degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York
Times. ' 79  Furthermore, in the absence of some showing that the of-
fending remarks created a "clear and present danger" of causing some
substantive harm, a court may not hold a sheriff in contempt who has
publicly criticized the judge's role in a grand jury investigation."0 As
to the fact that an elected official was involved, the Court said: "The
petitioner was an elected official and had the right to enter the field
of political controversy, particularly where his political life was at stake.
. . .The role that elected officials play in our society makes it all the
more imperative that they may be allowed freely to express themselves
on matters of current public importance.""'-
Turning to a different facet of the issue, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that, while a state may exact a higher standard of "loyalty" from
legislators than from plain citizens, presumably in application of the
public employee rationale, it may not be more restrictive of speech for
elective officials than for mere citizens.8 2  The New York Times stand-
ards apply. As a matter of fact, the Court hinted that elected officials
have even more freedom to express themselves on public issues than
do mere citizens, if that is possible, when it said:
The interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is
hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizen-critics
than to legislators. Legislators have an obligation to take positions
on controversial political questions so that their constituents can be
fully informed by them, and be fully able to assess their qualifica-
tions for office; also so -they may be represented in governmental
debates by the person they have elected to represent them.83
No case has been discovered that addresses the specific question
in issue: can a state proscribe the behavior described in the several
hypothetical situations and apply criminal sanctions to violators? The
79. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
80. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
81. Id. at 394.
82. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
83. Id. at 136-37.
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cases discussed above may be placed either into a general free speech
category, suggesting a right to speak out and be heard publicly on any
topic, or into a free association category, suggesting a right to associate
in private or in public with any person or group of persons for any
purpose short of perpetuating a substantive crime. In respect to free
speech, elected officials have no lesser first amendment rights than
mere citizens; no compelling interest can justify a restraint on their
speaking out on partisan political issues as it does in the case of public
employees. Nevertheless, the hypothetical sunshine law cases do not
fit the free speech model, but seem to be more analogous to that of
free association. That the state may demand loyalty of public officials,
including, presumably, if the public employee rationale holds, not hav-
ing knowingly been a member of an association committed to the over-
throw of the government by force or violence, seems well settled. That
the state may not require elected officials to eschew participation in
partisan politics seems so certain that it barely merits mentioning.
While these similarities and differences between public employment
and elective public service are instructive, they are not close enough
on point to settle the issues. They do, however, frame the question
that the Court would ask in ruling upon the validity of an open govern-
ment law in the context of the hypotheticals, and they provide a basis
for predicting the answer. The question is, does the state have a com-
pelling interest sufficient to justify the infringement of constitutionally
guaranteed freedoms that is represented by outlawing the described
behaviors.
What are the interests being protected by open government laws?
Although the courts have talked about the evils of conducting the pub-
lic's business "secretly" and in the "dark" behind "closed doors," the
mere exclusion of the public does not necessarily imply that the public's
interest is being badly served in the decisions made. Those catchy
phrases are merely surrogates for something else. Among the more
important public interests advanced by open government laws are that:
voters are enabled to evaluate their elected officials better; information
about current public issues will be better disseminated; public partici-
pation may supply information not otherwise available to the decision
makers; public participation may supply points of view that would
otherwise be ignored; and, perhaps most importantly, opportunities for
undetected official misconduct are narrowed.84
84. Note, 75 HAav. L. Rlv., supra note 3, at 1200-01.
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How do these purposes measure up against those involved in
previously litigated situations? "Loyalty" in the sense of vowing to
defend the government against powers that would overthrow it with
force and violence has been held to justify infringements on the free
speech of public employees, 85 and has been said in dictum to apply
to elected officials.86 Moreover, preventing the subversion of proper
administration of government through politicization of the civil service
justifies abridging the freedoms of association and speech of public em-
ployees in respect to partisan political activities.87  On the other hand,
the dangers to proper administration of government posed by public
criticism of the government, which may even be erroneous so long as
the bounds of the stringent New York Times criteria are not exceeded,
do not justify an infringement of the speech of either public em-
ployees 8 or elected officials.8 9  It could be argued by analogy that
avoidance of conflicts of interests and misappropriation of public
monies constitutes a sufficient state interest to justify some limits on
speech and association of elected officials, but that avoidance of mere
criticism of governmental operations does not.
Open meeting laws do not entail limiting speech in the sense of
forbidding one to make known his views to the public, as did the free
speech cases seen earlier. To the contrary, open government laws en-
courage that result. If applied to the hypothetical situations described,
however, they do stifle private conversation between individuals and
in a real sense insulate them from one another. Consequently, the
situations described more nearly represent restrictions on association
than on speech. Backing off from the non-quorum hypotheticals, one
should be able to argue successfully that a state's interest in preventing
the misdeeds recounted above is sufficient to place restrictions upon
association in regard to the manner in which elected officials sitting
as a public body make decisions on public business. That the state
could invalidate all decisions made in violation of any open meeting
law seems clear enough as a general proposition. That officials who
refuse to abide by the regulations could be caused to forfeit their posi-
tions seems equally clear on the basis of the loyalty and partisan poli-
tics cases. That officials who actually engage in some of the activities
85. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
86. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
87. See note 70 supra.
88. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
89. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966),
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sought to be prevented by open government law, for example appro-
priating the public's money for one's personal use, could be made the
subject of criminal sanctions also seems quite certain. But that merely
engaging in a meeting from which the public is excluded and making
decisions that are not in themselves contrary to the public interest or
otherwise unlawful could be made the subject of a criminal penalty is
not so certain. None of the "compelling state interest" cases has re-:
sulted in someone's being convicted in a criminal proseotuion.90 Only
the "clear and present danger" cases involved that issue.91 Therefore,
if criminal penalties are to apply to violations of open government laws,
it is arguable that a "clear and present danger" that the persons in-
volved will engage in some substantive evil must appear, and not just
that they will meet in secret. If such a showing must be made to con-
vict members who attend formal meetings of decision making bodies
outside public view, a fortiori no less a showing would be necessary
to convict individual officials for having engaged in any of the informal
meetings posed in the hypothetical situations. Thus, it would appear
that the officials in none of the situations could be criminally punished,
save in the fourth hypothetical situation and then only if the parties
90. The last two partisan politics cases are instructive. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601 (1973), an Oklahoma statute authorized dismissal upon violation, not
criminal penalties. Similarly, the federal Hatch Act cases, including the latest, United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973),
involved a statute authorizing dismissal or suspension, but not criminal penalties, 5
U.S.C. §§ 7323-25 (1970). See also Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968),
involving dismissal of a teacher because of criticism of school board policies.
The loyalty cases are in the same vein. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S.
716 (1951), was a reinstatement suit following a dismissal for cause under a California
law. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), was a declaratory action seeking
to invalidate a New York law (the Feinberg Law) that rendered disloyal persons ineli-
gible for employment or subject to removal. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 278
(1961), was a taxpayer's action to enjoin further payments to employees who had not
taken an Oklahoma loyalty oath. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278
(1961), was a suit to invalidate Florida's statute which required "immediate discharge"
of employees who refused to take a loyalty oath. Shelton v. TUcker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960), a slightly different case, was a declaratory suit involving an Arkansas statute
requiring disclosure by public employees of certain associations. Although it did involve
punishing refusal to disclose certain associations, Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959), is not an exception to the foregoing cases, because it involved a prosecution
for contempt of Congress and not a statutory eligibility requirement. See also Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957).
91. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), involved a criminal conspiracy
conviction for violation of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970), making unlawful
the advocacy of the overthrow of the government by force and violence and other ac-
tions. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), involved a conviction of contempt of
court with criminal sanctions imposed because of certain criticisms of a judge. See also
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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were plotting an action that was punishable of itself.
Assuming that the state could not impose criminal sanctions, ex-
cept as suggested above, could the state otherwise enforce an open gov-
ernment regulation by prohibiting any of the situations described? In-
validating decisions made in secret meetings presents no problem in
terms of the power of the state, but it would seem to be tilting wind-
mills except in the fourth hypothetical situation. Could the state, how-
ever, disqualify the persons involved from holding office as a result of
a violation? Based on the partisan politics cases,0 2 it might be deter-
mined by the courts that the state has a compelling interest in disquali-
fying individual officials who meet in non-quorum numbers to perpetu-
ate some result the open government law was designed to prevent, so
long as preventing that result was in itself a compelling interest of the
state. Could the state go further, however, and in broadshot manner
disqualify all the officials in all the situations even though they had
no intention to and did not perpetuate any of the unwanted results?
The partisan politics cases suggest an affirmative answer. 3  In them
the Court approved laws that regulate all partisan politics, and not just
specific acts that in fact subvert the interests of the state. Hence, it
appears that a general law disqualifying elected officials who attend
non-public meetings could be validly enforcedY4
Under closer inspection, however, the analogy is not so com-
pelling. In the first place, the risk of some unwanted result from the
free association of individual officials in the first through third hypo-
92. See notes 68-71 and accompanying text supra.
93. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), raises a caveat in this
analysis, however. Lafleur involved mandatory leave policies for pregnant school board
employees. The Court held that due process requirements invalidated conclusive pre-
sumptions about an individual's ability and safety in continuing to work beyond a speci-
fied period in the term of a pregnancy. The Court gave no hint, however, that it in-
tended to question the conclusive presumptions that it has formerly approved in the par-
tisan politics cases.
94. A separate and more difficult question is whether such a statute should be in-
validated on its face because of "overbreadth" of coverage. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601 (1973), the Court observed that:
[Tihe plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its
function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected
behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from "pure speech" to-
wards conduct and that conduct--even if expressive-falls within the scope of
otherwise val-d criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintain-
ing comprehensive controls over harmful. constitutio-ally unn-otocted conduct.
Id. at 615. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Since the first through
third hypothetical situations are constitutionally protected and are not "within the scope
of otherwise valid criminal laws," a statute outlawing them is arguably invalid on its
face and not just in application.
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thetical situations hardly seems to be one that the state has a compelling
interest of averting in this way. The cost of such a measure is quite
high. Not the least cost is the infringement of freedoms involved. But
that is not the only cost, including some that accrue directly to the state.
Ideas are seldom germinated and nurtured to fruition in a vacuum, and
the complete details and intricacies of controversial matters are seldom
examined fully in the course of a meeting of a board, whether it be
formal or informal. For example, one would never expect all the con-
stitutional ramifications of open government laws to be exposed in a
public meeting of a governmental body. Much of the early generation
and testing of ideas occurs in the ambiance of intense intellectual ex-
change that rarely occurs in formal meetings of public bodies. It may
also be true that schemes in conflict with the public good are bred in
the same intimate context. That outlawing the four hypothetical situa-
tions would shut down the positive side of this process is possible, but
that it would foreclose the negative side when telephones and personal
mobility make enforcement so tenuous anyway is hardly likely. So a
balance must be struck, first by the legislature, and ultimately, if in-
fringement of constitutional freedoms is involved, by the courts.
Striking a balance among the interests to be protected is never
easy. It might be that the interest of the state could never be com-
pelling enough to outlaw individual contacts made for information
gathering purposes, as in the second and third hypothetical situations.
On the other hand, enforcement difficulties being as great as they are,
a state might justify outlawing all secret decision making whether or
not the substance of the decision runs counter to the public interest.
This approach would catch the fourth hypothetical situation. If the
courts were to agree with these arguments, legislation that disqualifies
public officials that meet in pairs to decide how to vote on public issues,
whether the matters at issue were in themselves inimical to the public
good or not, would be validated on the basis of a compelling state inter-
est. By contrast, legislation that outlaws the other three situations
would be invalidated as infringing the constitutionally protected right
of association without a sufficient justification.95
95. Before leaving this inquiry, one should consider one further point that has been
raised by dicta in Florida cases. Assuming arguendo that the foregoing analyses were
rejected by the courts and that laws criminally outlawing the hypothetical situations were
validated, could one sustain a conviction in any of the situations under a law such as
Florida's which outlaws attendance at "meetings of any agency or authority of any
county, municipal corporation or any political subdivision . . . at which official acts are
to be taken. . . ." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (Supp. 1973). The issue boils down
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II. LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
Having examined the current state of open government laws, one
may be better able to settle upon various policies in developing a model
law. The following remarks will examine some differing positions and
indicate the ones that seem best to the authors. Based upon those
policy judgments, a model statute has been prepared and is attached
as an appendix.
Although precepts of open government including the right of the
people to attend and participate in meetings of public bodies would
seem to be intrinsic rights of -the people in a democratic nation, it has
been observed that they were not recognized in the antiquity of the
common law and must, therefore, be imposed by legislation or constitu-
tions. Given this status, each legislature that chooses to enact or
amend an open government law must select between the position that
to whether the statute applied to the hypothetical situation "'fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the stat-
ute." Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972), quoting United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). If it does not, then it is "void for vague-
ness" because "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Papachris-
tou of City of Jacksonville, supra at 162, citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940) and Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). That the Florida statutes give
no "fair notice" that luncheon discussions between two members of a board are prohib-
ited hardly merits debate. And, yet, the Florida Supreme Court, speaking in dictum in
a case that did not involve criminal prosecution, and applying standards quite similar
to those laid down by the United States Supreme Court, rejected void for vagueness ar-
guments and held that the Florida "statute complies with the requirements of organic
due process prescribed by the Constitution." Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224
So. 2d 693, 698 (Fla. 1969). In what can only be described as a flat contradiction to
the United States Supreme Court's rulings on vagueness, the Florida court has said that
"[ff a public official is unable to know whether by any convening of two or more offi-
cials he is violating the [open government] law, he should leave the meeting forthwith."
City of Miami Beach v. Bers, 245 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1971). This is a perfect analogy
to saying to a beggar on the street, "If a citizen is unable to know whether by appearing
on public streets he is violating the vagrancy law, he should leave the street forthwith."
The United States Supreme Court has condemned such an approach by a state as being
inconsistent with the freedom of its people. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, supra,
Furthermore, in the context of loyalty oath requirements the Court has held that "'a stat-
ute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion, violates the first essential of due process of law.'" Cramp v. Board of Pub. In-
struction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961), quoting Conally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1925). In sum, the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court that affected off i-
cials must "leave forthwith" when they cannot decide whether their conduct has been
outlawed runs directly contrary to constitutional freedoms as measured by the United
States Supreme Court. The upshot of this argument is, therefore, that if Florida or any
other state decides to outlaw the behavior described in any of the hypothetical situations,
to avoid constitutional invalidity on vagueness grounds the specific behavior outlawed
must be described explicitly enough that "men of common intelligence" need not guess
at its meaning. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
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everything not specifically closed is opened and the position that every-
thing not specifically opened is closed. Among the arguments that can
be advanced for limiting the openness of governmental decision mak-
ing are: that certain matters, if discussed in public, allow private inter-
ests to benefit at the public's expense (as in matters relating to the
purchase of lands); that openness will inhibit free give and -take among
officials and lead to poorly thought out decisions; that disputes between
policy makers and administrators, if publicly aired, will create difficult
and inefficient management of programs; that certain matters are too
sensitive for public view (certain personnel matters and matters of
security); that public officials will waste time in needless speechmaking
and other egosalving activities; and, that sensational and irresponsible
reporting of news will distort the facts and unjustifiably undermine con-
fidence in public officials.96
Although each of these criticisms has some credibility, none is
persuasive by itself and all of them together can justify no more than
the narrowest of exceptions at most. The arguments for open govern-
ment simply outweigh them."7 If there was ever a time when the
populace at large left the business of government to the chosen few,
that time is gone. Recent years have shown unprecedented levels of
public participation through every imaginable device including mass
demonstrations and hundreds of instances of civil disobedience. Need-
less to say, the routine business of city and county commission meetings
does not elicit such intense participation, but non-routine business
sometimes does, and some plain citizens watch over even the boring
stuff. Although it might not be empirically demonstrable, it seems
intuitively certain that openness produces better govermnental pro-
grams, more efficiency in government, and government more respon-
sive to public interests and less susceptible to corruption than does
secrecy. A free, literate and otherwise informed public should ask for
and should be satisfied with nothing less than openness in every level
of government. Consequently, the authors opt for a law that opens
governmental decision making except as explicitly closed. In choosing
this position, we are neither blinded to other public interests that some-
time require temporary confidentiality nor tempted to use it as a shib-
boleth to justify insensitive intrusions into the freedom of the people
it is intended to regulate. The limits and exceptions to openness must
be carefully and narrowly defined.
96. See Note, 75 HARv. L. REv., supra note 3, at 1199-1200, 1202.
97. See, e.g., id. at 1200-01.
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Before those points are addressed, however, two further general
attributes of openness need to be settled. The first is that true open-
ness requires a genuine opportunity for members of the public to be
in attendance at meetings of governmental bodies and also to partici-
pate actively whenever feasible. This implies that ample notice of
meetings is to be given, that they will be held at reasonable times and
in reasonably accessible places that are fully open to and can accom-
modate the public, and that members of the public can attend without
being required to stand any expense above normal expenses one ac-
crues in getting to any public place. Hence, if a public body is to hold
a public luncheon meeting, it would be in a place that accommodates
attending members of the public without cost whether or not they pur-
chase anything. Because the availability and capacity of facilities in
local communities vary widely, statutory requirements should be set
in terms of minimum criteria that must be met by whatever specific
conforming regulations are developed locally.
The second general attribute goes to which public bodies are
covered by the law. The openness policy that the authors favor re-
quires no less than that all policy making bodies be covered. To give
meaning to that expression, the term "public body" may be defined
as: all governmental bodies, whatever they may be named and in-
cluding the state legislature, to which members are elected under the
law by the citizens of this state or of any town, municipality, county
or other political subdivision or authority thereof, and shall include
committees, subcommittees, boards and commissions, whatever they
may be named, appointed by law, resolution or otherwise by or under
the authority of an elective body or elective official for the purpose
of assisting said elective body or elective official in performing its gov-
ernmental functions, whether said committees, subcommittees, boards
and commissions are comprised of elected officials or private persons
or both.
This coverage sweeps across every facet of collective decision
making at the policy level. It does not, however, invade the domain
of purely administrative decision making as exemplified by that of city
managers and county administrators in conducting the routine business
of their offices. Although no objection would be raised to having the
public informed as to what is being said and done in most management
affairs, to burden the executive operations of government with require-
ments of notice and meeting in public halls for any conference a man-
ager has with department heads would take openness to a foolhardy
476 [Vol. 53
OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS
extreme.93 The administrators should be responsible to the policy
makers, who in their decision-making role are the proper targets of
open government illumination.
The foregoing remarks neither advocate nor condone secrecy in
the management of governmental programs. They simply recognize
that control of public management raises different issues and requires
different techniques than does control of public policy making. A
fundamental point to be borne in mind is that public management is
a business. Garbage must be collected, sewers built, fires put out,
schools run, law breakers arrested, and all this, if it is to be done effec-
tively and economically, must be done under a nianagement plan that
does not include giving public notice and listening to citizen comments
on every management decision. Citizen recourse should be through
their policy makers, where all should be open. Moreover, another
means of management control is through open record laws, which is
a subject beyond the scope of this article.
An earlier section of this article showed that a major disputed is-
sue is whether and under what circumstances exemptions to the open
meeting concept can be justified. In fact, one may ask whether the
public interest is ever to be served by confidentiality. The answer is
clearly in the affirmative, if and only if, exemptions are now allowed
to swallow the rule. Preceding discussion has developed most of the
circumstances. National security (which is rarely, if ever, a matter of
state or local concern), attorney-client privilege, sensitive personnel
matters where reputations might be needlessly damaged or in which
the government may suffer the loss of valuable services, preparing for
collective bargaining, and perhaps, decisions on real property acquisi-
tion, all sometimes may involve factors that need to be considered or
acted upon by public bodies during a time when full disclosure would
be contrary to the public good. Warnings99 that public officials would
use exemptions to take all the business of the public behind closed
doors, cynical though they be, are not to be ignored. Accordingly,
98. For criticisms of "absolute openness" even as to elected bodies see Wickham,
supra note 4, at 490.
99. The Florida Supreme Court has raised this spectre on at least three occasions.
In Jones v. Tanzler, 238 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1970), it was said, "Following this reasoning,
any Council could divide itself into groups of small committees and each councilman
would have an opportunity to commit himself on some matter on which foreseeable ac-
tion will be taken by expressing himself at a secret committee meeting in the absence
of the public aud without giving the public an oportunity to be heard." Id. at 93 (con-
curring opinion).
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restraints should be placed upon the use of exemptions. These could
include convention in executive session only during the course of a
public meeting; allowing it only for specific purposes within authorized
exemptions and only upon greater than majority vote of the public body
involved; requiring immediate reports of non-confidential aspects of
the matters concerned; and, requiring the release by a specified certain
date of all minutes, recordings and other official records and documents
stemming from the executive session. Coupling these restrictions with
appropriate sanctions should hold down the use of executive sessions
and come close to eliminating its abuse.
Examination of judicial interpretatons of open government laws
has shown that the courts have split on whether "meetings" include
both gatherings for taking formal action and gatherings for obtaining
information and otherwise informally discussing a matter of public
business. Insofar as meetings of the whole of public bodies, or even
of members in numbers large enough to reach a collective decision of
the body, are concerned, the better position and the one adopted in
drafting the proposed model statute is that any meeting in which mat-
ters of public business are to be considered should be public meetings.
Attempting to extend coverage to less than quorum gatherings runs
smack into the face of practicality and, more fundamentally, into the
sanctuary of individual freedoms of the affected officials, discussed
above.
The constitutional arguments will not be repeated, but an addi-
tional component of practicality deserves mention. Spontaneity of idea
production and pre-fixed time schedules rarely coincide. Consequently,
to insist rigidly upon one risks the loss of the other. Because the line
between policy development and implementation is frequently thin,
especially in local government where whether or not a tree is to be cut
can sometimes be policy, some leeway is called for. Frequently, public
officials have a need to visit sites or otherwise gather background infor-
mation outside public meetings. Except when constituted as com-
mittees that make recommendations, little harm is done by nonquorum
members gathering information on the spur of the moment and a lot of
good could accrue. Ordinarily the information obtained will be reported
to the parent body in an open meeting for discussion and decision if
appropriate. While nonquorum meetings could be employed as a
subterfuge for developing a consensus on a public issue outside a public
meeting, successful policing of intentional misbehavior of that sort
would hardly be worth the costs.
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The preceding remarks point up that enforcement, or more im-
portantly, enforceability is a key element of the open government
concept. While it might be argued that a legislative or constitutional
open government policy without enforcement mechanisms would be
worthless, that probably is not true. 100 Most public officials would
honor the policy most of the time.101  Unfortunately, the exceptions
might be occasions when public scrutiny is most needed. Accordingly,
a full range of legitimate enforcement schemes should be provided.
Injunctions, invalidations of actions taken, criminal penalties, and sus-
pensions or removal from office all have been employed.'0 2  Except
for criminal penalties, which have been shown to be of doubtful consti-
tutional validity in most open government contexts, each of these is
a valid sanction if used properly.
That injunctions are appropriate devices for bringing recalcitrant
public bodies in line goes without saying. If the members continually
ignore the requirements of the law, citizens should be able to seek re-
lief in the courts. Moreover, it should be observed also that courts
could legitimately use incarceration and fines to enforce contempt
powers if the officials persist in violating the law -to the point of ignoring
court orders. But merely enjoining or even jailing public officials who
violate the law does not correct the harm that may already be done
by decisions taken in secret. Consequently, courts should be given au-
thority to invalidate tainted actions upon petition of citizens. Invalida-
tion should be discretionary, however, within the constraints of what
is in the best interest of the public at the time the court makes its
ruling. In many cases an earlier defect could have been rendered
harmless by full disclosure and debate in later public meetings. Cer-
tainly the public, including the public body involved, should be entitled
to adduce evidence on that point. In those cases, and perhaps in others
where the substance of the decision taken in violation of the law is
not contrary to the public interest, invalidation might create unneces-
sary delays or costs in the decisionmaking process. Indeed, in a case
such as Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison,10 3 where the invalidity was
100. Apparently a number of states have no enforcement mechanisms. See note 34
supra. See also Wickham, supra note 4, at 495 (discussion of the need of enforcement).
101. Even the suspicious Supreme Court of Florida suggested this is so, when it said,
"Few, if any, governmental boards or agencies deliberately attempt to circumvent the
government in the sunshine law." Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473
476 (Fla. 1974).
102. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
103. 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974), affg ]DS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach,
279 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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attributed to earlier meetings of an inferior appointive body even after
the board in question had held full public hearings, it is hard to see
how the defects in the decision process could have harmed the public
in any way. In every case courts should be given discretion to produce
the best result for the public and not be constrained rigidly to invalidity
as a remedy.
10 4
Apart from judicial contempt powers and the possible embarrass-
ment of being in violation of the law, what other punitive measures
should be available to control the individuals who might violate the
law? Criminal penalties are to be eschewed both because of constitu-
tional difficulties and doubtful utility.'0 5 Sustaining a criminal prosecu-
tion would apparently require showing that the violations involved
scienter'06 and would certainly require proof of all the elements of the
crime "beyond a reasonable doubt." That convictions would seldom
be obtained in crimes as innocuous as "secretly" attending a meeting
seems certain, especially when the crime contained no element of sub-
stantative illegality. The public has a healthy skepticism about the
doings of public officials, but it probably does not go that far.
That criminal penalties are inappropriate does not mean that pub-
lic officials may not be individually called to account for violations of
104. Arguably, a statutory requirement that all final actions be taken in public con-
templates the invalidity of actions taken in private. Whether these secret actions are
void or merely voidable remains unsettled. The problem may be illustrated by the cases
of Elmer v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 343 Mass. 24, 176 N.E.2d 16 (1961); Toyah
Independent School Dist. v. Pecos-Barstow Independent School Dist., 466 S.W.2d 377
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971). In Elmer, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that "[ijnxalidation of action taken, although it would tend strongly to enforce the [stat-
utory] policy, would not be primarily a remedial measure" and refuted to invalidate
actions taken at an improperly noticed meeting. 343 Mass. at 27, 176 N.E.2d at 18.
In Toyah School District, a Texas court declared the Texas Open Meetings Act manda-
tory and, in granting invalidation, suggested that "[to say the statute is mandatory, and
at the same time to insist that action taken in disregard of its mandatory provisions is in-
sulated against challenge is to utter a contradiction." 466 S.W.2d at 480. The Iowa
court, in Dobrovolny v. Reinhardt, - Iowa -, 173 N.W.2d 837 (1970), refused to in-
validate actions taken privately, holding that the statutory remedies were exhaustive and
that authority for invalidation must come from the legislature. A well-reasoned dis-
senter argued that the majority recognized the public's statutory right to know but re-
fused to grant the only available remedy when the statutory violations are complete. The
dissent further argued that the court should fashion its remedies to give full effect to
the important legislative policy.
105. Criminal penalties have been called "the most common and least useful sanc-
tion found in current legislation." Wickham, supra note 4, at 496.
106. In Board of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969), the Florida
Supreme Court, in dictum, read the requirement of scienter into the Florida law. The
California statute is explicit on the point, making a violation criminally actionable only
when action is taken "with knowledge of the fact that the meeting is in violation" of
the law. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54959 (West 1966).
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open government laws.10 7  By analogy to the loyalty and partisan poli-
tics laws, it can be argued that willingness to conduct public business
in public is a qualifying condition to continue holding office. Conse-
quently, if an official intentionally violates a properly drafted law, he
may be suspended or even removed from office. This sanction is not
only less subject to constitutional invalidity than is a criminal one but is
also more likely to be effective in practice. In the first place, suspension
or removal from office would be a far more serious consequence to
most officials than would a fine or even a short stint in jail. For an-
other, removal from office would not require meeting the stringent
criteria of criminal prosecutions, such as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and unanimous jury verdicts. This assertion obviously opens up
another line of constitutional inquiry that will be mentioned but not
pursued here. The Supreme Court's ruling in Bond v. Floyd,'0 8 that an
elected public official cannot be required to give up his constitutional
freedom to speak out on public issues as a qualification for public office,
is obviously a limit in respect to open government laws, but it is one
that need never be reached in stating a workable law.109 Moreover,
removal is not only of greater constitutional validity than criminal pen-
alties, but it is also more likely to be effective in practice. In the first
place, suspension or removal from office would be a far more serious
consequence to many public officials than would a fine or even a jail
sentence. For another, suspension or removal from office in a non-
criminal proceeding would presumably not be required to meet the
stringent criteria of criminal prosecutions, including, for example, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimous jury verdicts.110 It goes with
107. As this article is being written, a former Secretary of Education of Florida is
under indictment and has resigned his office because of charges of misuse of his office
for personal gain and at least two others of a seven person cabinet are under investiga-
tion. Resignation was made on April 25, 1974. Moreover, in 1973 the Lieutenant Gov-
ernor of Florida was censured by the legislature for misuse of his office and was re-
moved from his appointed post of Secretary of Commerce. It follows, therefore, that
even a strong sunshine law will not eliminate abuses such as this. Moreover, when they
occur, more effective sanctions are available in other laws.
108. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
109. This assumption is not to be taken for granted, however. In a commentary
on Bond v. Floyd, it was said that "no court, federal or state, had assumed the power
to determine the qualifications of an elected member of a legislative body." Annot., 17
L. Ed. 2d 911, 912 (1966). Bond v. Floyd broke that silence at least to the extent of
guarding against the use of impermissible qualifications. See also Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). In that case, the Court held that Powell had been imper-
missibly excluded from his seat in Congress, but explicitly expressed "no view on what
limitations may exist on Congress's power to expel or otherwise punish a member once
he has been seated." Id. at 507 n.27.
110. For example, Florida's constitution authorizes the governor to suspend munici-
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saying, however, that removal would require the affording of consti-
tutionally acceptable due process to the person removed from office.'
IX. CONCLUSION
The news media and especially the press can be justifiably proud
of the roles they have played in bringing open government laws into
being in many states." 2 In this they have been true guardians of the
public interest, as they have been in assiduously policing public affairs
to ferret out governmental abuses for public view and correction. With
that background some members of the media are likely to view certain
of this article's policy conclusions with disfavor and, perhaps, distrust.
As examples, why should the law not apply to non-quorum gatherings?
How can exemptions really be justified? And, why should the law
have no criminal sanctions? In short, some are likely to view the pro-
posed model statute as nothing but a "gutting" of some existing version.
pal officers when "indicted for crime," and to suspend county officers for "malfeasaice,
misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence," and other reasons. FLA.
CONsT. art. IV, § 7. The Arkansas removal statute provided in part: "Any member
of a board or commission who participates in a closed meeting except for the discussion
of matters declared to be privileged as set out in Section 2 [§ 6-602] of this Act, shall
be subject to dismissal by the Governor of the State of Arkansas or by proper proceed-
ings brought in a court of competent jurisdiction." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-603 (1956),
repealed, No. 66, § 1, (1961] Ark. Acts 148.
111. In an old case involving removal of an elected official, the Supreme Court laid
down the general rule that removal is a matter of state constitutional and legislative law.
Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586 (1898). In Wilson the Court said that "if the
Supreme Court of a State had acted in consonance with the constitutional laws of a state
and its own procedure, it could only be in very exceptional circumstances that this court
would feel justified in saying that there had been a failure of due legal process." Id.
at 594. While Wilson did not attempt to define due process requirements, it did hold
that jury trial was not required.
Guidance can be found in a series of recent cases in which the Supreme Court has
evolved standards of due process that apply in respect to removal of government employ-
ees. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). While these cases may not
comprehend all the issues involved in the removal of elected public officials, they do
indicate that due process protections must be afforded persons whose governmental jobs
have a "property" interest component that can be diverted only upon a showing of
"cause." Since suspension or removal for violating the sunshine law would be for cause,
at least those protections would presumably be afforded. Even as to governmental em-
ployees, there is dispute among the members of the Court as to the nature of the pro-
ceedings required to discharge a tenured employee permissibly. In Arnett v. Kennedy,
supra, the latest case, the plurality opinion was that the legislation creating the tenured
position could define the scope of the dismissal procedure, at least within limits. Arnett
approved a procedure that allowed dismissal prior to an evidentiary hearing so long as
such a hearing with appropriate remedies were to be held in due time. The three dis-
senting justices would require an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissal. See also Note,
Removal of Public Officers in Louisiana, 46 TUL. L. REV. 777 (1972).
112. See Note, 75 HARV. L. REv., supra note 3.
OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS
In a time when the public and especially the media portion of it are
so justified in their suspicions of public officials, reactions of that sort
are not unexpected.
Perhaps, brief allusions to an analogous issue will prove persuasive
to some newspeople. Presently the press is under terrific pressure from
government. Not only has a figure of no less importance than a Vice-
President of the United States taken some of their numbers to task pub-
licly but local prosecutors and judges have used criminal contempt as
a device to pry others loose from their news sources. It should not
be gainsaid that news reporters are public persons by choice just as
elected officials are and that they sometimes have more effect on the
public than do elected officials. Yet, many members of the media and
of the public believe such a use of -the contempt power to be an un-
warranted intrusion upon the first amendment's guarantee of a free
press. In that sense such a practice inhibits newspeople in going about
the public's business of informing itself of what goes on in the com-
munity. By the same token public officials should not be turned into
elected pariahs that may not see or communicate with each other ex-
cept in ceremonial fish bowls. Within the rather restrictive ambit of
the regulations outlined above, they should be allowed to inform them-
selves fully about the decisions they must make for the public just as
newspeople go about informing themselves to answer their charge to
serve the public.
One really cannot press -the analogy between open government
laws and so called "shield" laws too far because it rapidly breaks down.
The one thing that does not break down, however, is the first amend-
ment freedom nesting at the heart of each issue when it is pushed to
the extreme. Perhaps even the skeptics that reject arguments of
practicality as bold surrogates for secrecy will be sensitive to the issue
of guaranteed constitutional freedom. When the media and the public
accept its erosion for one class among us, who is to say which class
is next?
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Appendix I
Open Meeting Law Of The State of
XXX.01 Definitions.
(1) "Public body" means any entity defined by Sec. XXX.01(2) or Sec.
XXX.01(3).
(2) "Board or commission of any state agency or authority" shall include
boards or commissions, including the legislature, to which members are
elected under law by the citizens of this State, and shall include committees
and subcommittees; whatever they may be named, appointed by law, resolu-
tion or otherwise by or under the authority of an elective body or official
for the purpose of assisting an elective body or official in performing its direct
functions, whether said committees and subcommittees are comprised of
elected officials or private persons or both.
(3) "Agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation or any po-
litical subdivision" shall include all bodies to which members are elected un-
der law by the citizens of a county or municipality or any other political sub-
division of this State, and shall include committees and subcommittees, what-
ever they may be named, appointed by law, resolution or otherwise by or
under the authority of an elective body or official for the purpose of assisting
an elective body or official in performing its direct functions, whether said
committees and subcommittees are comprised of elected officials or private
persons or both.
(4) "Private person" is a natural person appointed to serve on a public
body under the authority of an elective body of which said person is not a
member.
(5) A "meeting at which public acts are to be taken" is any gathering in
person of not less than a quorum of the members of a public body that has
been scheduled or otherwise previously arranged among the persons so gath-
ering for the purpose of conducting the business of said body. Any gathering
of not less than a quorum of the members of public body becomes a meeting
at which public acts are to be taken whenever said gathering begins to con-
duct the business of said body.
(6) A "public meeting" is a meeting held at a time and place which is rea-
sonably accessible to members of the public and which is in fact fully open
to members of the public who attempt to attend at the scheduled time and
place. A meeting does not fail to be public merely because held at a time
or place that is inconvenient for some citizen or citizens or because every
person who attempts to attend cannot be accommodated in the meeting place.
(7) A "regularly scheduled public meeting" of a public body is a public
meeting that is scheduled in accordance with standing rules adopted by or
specified for said public body, or one that is scheduled by a public body at
a previous public meeting.
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(8) An "emergency public meeting" of a public body is a public meeting
that is not a regularly scheduled public meeting that has been called by the
chairman or members of said public body.
(9) "To conduct the business" of a public body is to engage in any activ-
ity of the public body that would ordinarily and appropriately be conducted
in a public meeting.
(10) A "quorum' of the members of a public body means a simple major-
ity or more of the total number of members comprising said body at a given
time, or, if less than a simple majority is required to take a collective deci-
sion, a quorum includes any number that by the rules of the public body can
by vote bind it to a collective decision of its members.
XXX.02 Meetings open to the public and minutes; Notice of public meet-
ings; unlawful devices and subterfuge.
(1) All meetings of any public body, except as otherwise provided by law
at which public acts are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open
to the public at all times. The minutes of a public meeting of any public
body shall be promptly recorded and shall be open to public examination.
(2) Public notice shall be given of all public meetings of public bodies in
accordance with rules prescribed by the body, if it is an elective body, or
if it is an appointive body, by the elective body under which it is appointed.
In no case may a regularly scheduled public meeting of a public body be con-
vened earlier than twenty-four hours after the time of convention of the pub-
lic meeting of said body at which it was scheduled, and in no case may an
emergency public meeting be convened earlier than two hours after notice
is given to representatives of the news media under rules to be prescribed
under this subsection.
(3) Any device or subterfuge undertaken by members of a public body
with the intention of making final collective decisions of public business with-
out holding a public meeting for open discussion of the issues involved shall
be unlawful. Nothing herein shall make illegal informal discussions, either
in person or telephonically, between members of public bodies for the pur-
pose of obtaining facts and opinions provided that there is no intention of
violating the first sentence of this subsection and provided that subsections
(1) and (2) of this section are not violated.
XXX.03 Exceptions; juridical functions; certain personnel matters; prop-
erty acquisition; certain quasi-judicial matters; summaries of ex-
ecutive sessions.
(1) The requirements of Sec. XXX.02 shall not apply to courts and petit
juries while deliberating and to meetings of grand juries; nor shall this act
otherwise impair courts and judges in the exercise of existing powers in con-
ducting juridical proceedings.
(2) The public may be excluded during executive sessions of public meet-
ings that otherwise conform to this act for the following purposes:
1975] 485
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a. considering the appointment, employment, promotion, dismissal or
removal of a public employee, unless said person requests that the public not
be excluded:
b. considering the acquisition of property under circumstances in which
premature public knowledge would be likely to affect adversely the public's
interest in making said acquisition;
c. consulting with legal counsel concerning pending or proposed litiga-
tion;
d. consulting with staff, counsel and consultants concerning collective
bargaining issues and proposals.
All proceedings conducted in executive session shall be sound recorded
and said recordings shall be made available for public hearing as soon as the
public's interest would not likely be adversely affected by their release, and
no later than one year from the date of said executive session at most. Cop-
ies of all memoranda and notes used to convey information during said execu-
tive session shall be retained for release to the public along with said record-
ings.
A summary of subjects discussed and final actions taken while the public
is 'xcluded shall be announced to the members of the public present at the
conclusion of any executive session of a public body and a written summary
shall be made available for public examination not later than the close of
business of the second succeeding business day after conclusion of the execu-
tive session. Said summaries may exclude specific information temporarily
until the public's interest would not likely be adversely affected by its release.
(3) The requirements of Sec. XXX.02 shall not apply to meetings held for
the purposes of mediation or conciliation of complaints by public bodies, such
as Civil Rights Commissions, authorized by law to enforce said law through
mediation and conciliation.
XXX.04 Enforcement; invalidating non-conforming actions; injunctions;
criminal sanctions; removal from office.
(1) No law, ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation or other collective deci-
sion of a public body shall be valid unless taken or approved at a properly
noticed public meeting. The trial courts of general jurisdiction of this State
shall have jurisdiction to issue orders invalidating said actions taken by a pub-
lic body not in conformity with this act upon application of any citizen of
this State. Whether or not later public approval of any public action for-
merly invalidly taken by a public body or by a subordinate public body cures
the former invalidity is to be determined by the court on the basis of what
is in the best interest of the public in respect to the disputed matter at the
time the court renders its opinion.
(2) The courts of general jurisdiction of this State shall have jurisdiction
to issue injunctions to enforce this act upon application of any citizen of this
State.
(3) Any person who is u member of a public body who knowingly attends
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a meeting at which public acts are to be taken with the intention of avoiding
the requirements of Sec. XXX.02(1) or Sec. XXX.02(2) or who knowingly
violates Sec. XXX.02(3), may be suspended or removed from office by pro-
ceedings brought in a court of general jurisdiction in this State. Said proceed-
ings may be commenced by petition of not less than ten qualified electors
within the jurisdiction of the public body of the accused person. Said pro-
ceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the rules of civil procedure,
shall be without recourse to jury determination, and shall be decided by the
court upon the preponderance of the evidence.
(4) Upon a determination that a member of a public body has violated
the act for the first time during any term of office, said member may in the
discretion of the judge be suspended from office and all rights and privileges
of office for a period of not less than ten days and not more than thirty days,
or removed from office for the remainder of said term. In the event of any
subsequent violation during a given term of office, said person shall be re-
moved from office for the remainder of said term.
(5) Any person removed from any public office shall not be eligible for
election or appointment to any public body until the expiration of one full.
year after the normal expiration of said person's term of office.
Appendix H
Open Government Laws
Alabama ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 393-94 (1958).
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.3 10 (Supp. 1973).
Arizona ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-431 to -431.08
(Supp. 1973), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
Arkansas ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-602 to -604 (1956), as
amended, (Supp. 1973).
California CAL. Gov'T CODE § § 54950-60 (West Supp. 1974).
Colorado CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-19-1 (1963),
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-21 to -21a (1969),
as amended, (Supp. 1974).
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5109 (Cum. Supp.
1968).
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (Supp. 1973).
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-802, -9912, 40-3301, -9911
(1971), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
wi.HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 92-1 to-3 (1967).
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IDAHO CODE § 59-1024 (Supp. 1973).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 41-46 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1974).
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 57-601 to -609 (Burns 1962),
as amended, (Bums Supp. 1973).
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 28A-A.8 (Supp. 1974).
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-4317 to -4320 (Supp.
1973).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87.030, 88.040 (1971).
LA. REV. STAT. §§ 42:5-:9 (1965), as amended,
(Supp. 1974).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401-06 (1964), as
amended, (Supp. 1973); id. § 404-A (Supp. 1974).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23A, § 8, art. 25, § 5 (1973);
id. art. 41, § 14 (1971).
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 30(A), § 11 (A), ch. 34,
§ 9(F), ch. 39, §§ 23(A)-(C) (1973).
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.46(7) (d) (1973).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10.41 (1967); id. § 471.705
(Cum. Supp. 1974).
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 610.010-.030 (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1974).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-1401 (1971).
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 241.010-.040, 244.080,
268.305, 386.335, 396.100 (1971).
N.H. STAT. ANN. §§ 91A:1-:8 (Supp. 1973).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:4-1 to -5 (Supp. 1974).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-6-23 to -26 (Supp. 1974).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.1-.7 (1974).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1960).
Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Page 1969).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 201-02 (Supp. 1973).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 251-54 (1959).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-43-7 (Supp. 1973).
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-25-1 to -2 (1967).
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TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17 (Supp.
1973).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-1 (1970).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 311-14 (Cum. Supp.
1973).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.32.010-.020 (1972).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.77 (Supp. 1974).

